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PREEMPTIVE OR PREVENTIVE WAR: A DISCUSSION OF LEGAL
AND MORAL STANDARDS
Steven J. Barela*
Common in today's discourse about U.S. foreign policy are the terms
preemptive and preventive war. An enormous problem with the use of these terms
is that there has been little attempt to clarify their specific meanings, much less
initiate a discussion over their ethical and legal implications. This problem has
resulted in an environment of ambiguity for determining and discussing a standard
for when the United States is to engage in war. The objective of this essay is to
raise the level of understanding of the important distinctions between these two
Through this
terms by examining their legal, moral, and current uses.
investigation, I hope to achieve a clearer understanding of the war-making policies
of our nation and all others.
First, it is necessary to discuss the significant intersection between the
concepts of ethics and international law. At this point in history, one might
describe international law as a system of largely unenforceable norms that nations
share to better predict and evaluate behavior between states. What comprises these
customs tends to emerge out of a concerted effort to search through historical
precedent to find-and, when possible, to codify-normative interaction. There is
no official body entrusted with this task, and it therefore might be explained as an
accepted inter-subjectivity. One might even say that, often times, these norms or
laws arise from each state's choice to refrain from a particular behavior since it
would not like to see this specific action visited upon itself. I suggest that this is
the same process that allows one to arrive at similar ethical determinations. Intersubjectivity, or understanding of a shared reality, seems to be the critical building
block for establishing a code of ethics or norms for a law of nations.
This is not to be confused with the concept of legal moralism, which contends
that it is possible and necessary to codify a prohibition of behavior based on the
shared morality of the majority in a society, even when the behavior does not
endanger others physically or psychologically.' International law might instead be
generally understood as seeking to protect members of international society
without imposing cultural or religious biases or morals.
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There is an essential distinction between personal moral behavior and the
moral behavior of states. Individuals who negotiate for state governments might
often be purely self-interested and oblivious to the common good of their people
and, thus, sign unethical treaties that are advantageous only for the elite.
Therefore, it is erroneous to assume that, unless a state truly represents the interests
of its people, it is the single unitary actor in international affairs and is fully
capable of acting morally. This circumstance is certainly problematic, but in the
current global structure of nation-states there does not appear to be an obvious
solution other than advocating for ethical arguments in the legal forum and
criticizing those treaties that might undermine the common good. Hence, I intend
to approach the topic of preemptive and preventive war with an ethical analysis
aimed at optimistically creating the conditions for an inter-subjective legal
consensus based on the stark difference between these two terms, in both their
meaning and moral implications.
U.S. Department of Defense Dictionary
To begin, we will turn to the dictionary created by the U.S. Department of
Defense (DOD) to reach for clarity on the distinction between the two terms in
question. It would perhaps be overreaching to take these definitions as definitive,
since they are but one linguistic clarification, and would thus fail the litmus test of
a global inter-subjectivity. However, considering that the U.S. government
produced this dictionary, the same government that brought the issue of
preemptive and preventive war to the forefront of world politics, it does provide a
substantive starting point. "Preemptive attack: An attack initiated on the basis of
incontrovertible evidence that an enemy attack is imminent."2 "Preventive war: A
war initiated in the belief that military conflict, while not imminent, is inevitable,
and that to delay would involve greater risk."3 The first feature in these definitions
worth noting is that the DOD actually recognizes that there are, in fact, two
different levels of anticipatory self-defense. In addition, there is a marked
difference in tone between the two definitions. Leaving no room for doubt about
the burden of proof for the cases in which it is applied, the language used to define
preemption is particularly commanding. On the other hand, prevention is based on
certain subjectivity that allows for interpretation in each case in which it is applied.
Additionally, there is a stark contrast in linguistic strength, and hence, moral tone,
between the words incontrovertible and imminent when compared with the terms
belief and risk. This author suggests that many would not argue with the notion
that, by these descriptions, preemption would appear to be a moral act of self-
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defense, while preventive war would regularly raise doubts because of its inherent
subjectivity. With these two apt and functioning definitions established by the
DOD, it is necessary to see whether the same distinctions and clarity will hold up
when investigated historically.
Historical Treatment of Anticipatory Self-Defense
No matter how we define and distinguish the terms preemptive and preventive
war, they will no doubt fall into the same category of a perceived defensive
maneuver before an attack has occurred and, hence, be considered some type of
anticipatory self-defense. Therefore, it is necessary to first establish that the
concept of anticipatory self-defense actually exists in customary international law.
I first turn to the often accepted father of codified international law, Hugo Grotius,
and his work, On The Law of War and Peace.4 First published in 1625, this
voluminous work of three books treats the subject of anticipatory self-defense in
Book II, Chapter I:
The danger must be immediate, which is one necessary point. Though it must be
confessed, that when an assailant seizes any weapon with an apparent intention
to kill me I have a right to anticipate and prevent the danger. For in the moral as
well as the natural system of things, there is no point without some breadth. But
they are themselves much mistaken, and mislead others, who maintain that any
degree of fear ought,5 to be a ground for killing another, to prevent his
SUPPOSED intention.
Here, Grotius indeed recognizes a right to anticipatory self-defense if the
threat reaches a level of certainty and proximity in time. However, this right is
clearly not proclaimed to exist without any constraint. Although there are
moments in which one can act before injury occurs, there is evidently a line that, if
crossed, changes a self-defensive action's moral character and legality.
In a subsequent section of the same Book II, Grotius addresses the notion that
state is
a state might claim the right to use force to disarm another state if the other
6
acquiring weapons and power that will come to imperil itself and others:
Some writers have advanced a doctrine which can never be admitted,
maintaining that the law of nations authorises one power to commence hostilities
against another, whose increasing greatness awakens her alarms. As a matter of
expediency such a measure may be adopted, but the principles of justice can
never be advanced in its favour. The causes which entitle a war to the
denomination of just are somewhat different from those of expediency alone.
But to maintain that the bare probability of some remote, or future annoyance
from a neighbouring state affords a just ground of hostile aggression, is a
doctrine repugnant to every principle of equity. Such however is the condition of

4. HUGO GROTIUS, ON THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE (Francis W. Kelsey trans., Legal Classics
Library 1984) (1625), http://www.geocities.com/Athens/Thebes/8098/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2005).
at 173.
5. Id.
6. Id..at 184.
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human life, that no full security can be enjoyed. The only protection against
from violence, but from the divine
uncertain fears must be sought, not
7
providence, and defensive precaution.
Once again, Grotius is explicit and direct in his assessment. I suggest that
Grotius depicts what might be construed as a definition of preemption with
caveats. The latter quote could also fit the description of preventive war. In fact,
with the inclusion of some strong moral judgments, Grotius' quotes fit nicely with
the DOD presentations.
A century after the publication of Grotius' work, the Swiss author of Law of
Nations, Emmerich de Vattel, also wrote of anticipatory self-defense, again with a
caution against imprudence:
It is safest to prevent the evil when it can be prevented. A nation has a right to
resist an injurious attempt, and to make use of force and every honorable
expedient against whosoever is actually engaged in opposition to her, and even
to anticipate his machinations, observing, however, not to attack him upon vague
and uncertain suspicions, 8lest she should incur the imputation of becoming
herself an unjust aggressor.
Both de Vattel and Grotius recognize the fact that it is not necessary to await
the first blow of an attack before a nation can justly use force. It is also
noteworthy that a strong cautionary note is traditionally sounded to guide this
anticipatory principle. Finally, the solemn warning by de Vattel seems explicit in
how one can, in turn, commit the crime of aggression if indiscriminate action is
taken.
In the nineteenth century, echoing Grotius, the U.S. Secretary of State, Daniel
9
Webster set forth a precise definition for the term preemption. In what is now
commonly known as the Caroline incident, Webster asserted that the necessity for
preemptive self-defense must be "instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of
means, and no moment for deliberation."' ° This strict and precise definition,
fitting the widely accepted meaning of imminent, was reaffirmed in the Nuremberg
Trials which, for the first time, held government officials responsible for state
actions. 1
United Nations Charter
Today, one customarily turns to the U.N. Charter to settle questions of
legality under international law. 12 Unfortunately, the Charter appears to be unable
to bring clarity to either the legality or morality of preemptive or preventive war.

7. Id. at 184.
8. EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW, Book

11,Chapter IV (1758), http://www.lonang.com/exlibris/vattel/vatt-204.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2005).
9. Frederic L. Kirgis, Pre-emptive Action to Forestall Terrorism, AM. SOC'Y INT'L L INSIGHT
(June 2002), at http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh88.htm.

10. Id.
11. Id.
Law:
An
Institute,
Intemational
Information
12. Legal
http://www.law.comell.edu/topics/international.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2005).
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However, considering that the first words of the Charter preamble begin, "[w]e the
peoples of the United Nations determined to save succeeding generations from the
scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to
mankind," it is evident that the intention was to limit the use of force in the
international arena. 13 Additionally, Article 2(4) of the Charter explicitly requires
that "[a]ll members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state,14
or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."'
The only other place in the Charter in which the possibility of unilateral force is
considered is in Article 51, in which the "inherent right of individual or collective
self-defence if an armed attack occurs" is enshrined. 15 However, it is also
explicitly stated in the same article that final authority lies with the Security
Council,
even in extreme circumstances when force is deemed necessary and
16
legal:
Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be
immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the
authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter.
17

Although there are no descriptive definitions of preemption and preventive
war, the Charter contains explicit restrictions on states' use of force even in cases
of self-defense. It is difficult to say whether a literal reading of these statutes, in
which all anticipatory self-defense would be ruled out, would be acceptable to the
entire international community. Undoubtedly, however, the overall intention of
the Charter was to limit unilateral military action. Therefore, when looking to see
whether either of these terms meets the spirit and letter of the Charter, it seems
necessary to look for guiding principles that are restrictive rather than expansive.
In the evidence presented above, we see that the assertion of the National
Security Strategy released by the White House in October 2002 is in fact correct
when it asserts that "[flor centuries, international law recognized that nations need
not suffer an attack before they can lawfully take action to defend themselves
against forces that present an imminent danger of attack."' 8 However, along with
this right, come clear requirements of prudence, lest the state initiating the use of
force commit crimes against the peace, as was charged against Germany and its
officials in the Nuremberg Trials following World War II.19
More importantly, though, we have also found a salient distinction for
characterizing the different types of anticipatory self-defense. As described above,
Preemption is a lawful and moral use of force, as long as tremendous discretion
13. U.N. CHARTER pmbl., http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2005).
14. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4, http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2005).
15. U.N. CHARTER art. 51, http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2005).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. The
National
Security
Strategy
of
the
United
States
of
America,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/print/nssall.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2004).
19. Kirgis, supranote 9.
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accompanies preemptive action to ensure that the threat is both certain and
imminent. Yet after, looking at the previous documents, preventive war does not
seem to merit the same endorsement. I suggest that the primary reason for this
apprehension is that preventive war, by its nature, is based on speculation of intent
and capabilities. It is quite problematic to assert that any type of conjecture on
future events could be. construed as an act of self-defense. Once we have removed
the certitude that accompanies the concept of preemption, one begins to deal with
worst case scenarios and decisions driven by Hobbesian diffidence.20 Few would
assert that fear brings clarity and prudence in decision-making. Therefore, I
suggest that the real distinction between preemptive and preventive war is based on
an essential moral divergence. Ethical behavior is often simplified into the
"golden rule" found in all of the world's major religions: do unto others as you
would have them do unto you.21 It is unlikely that any nation would characterize a
preventive war against itself as defensible, since preventive war is, by definition,
based on unsubstantiated and unverifiable claims. Yet a nation about to attack
another would not like to meet preemptive resistance; it seems highly unlikely that
the nation initiating the attack would accuse the defender of acting unjustly. The
question remains whether the policy advocated by the George W. Bush
administration is in fact preemption or preventive war.
The Bush Doctrine: Preemption or Preventive War?
The opening salvo in the current debate was launched on June 1, 2002, in a
graduation speech at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point by President George
W. Bush.22 The United States had recently won an initial military victory in
Afghanistan, and President Bush had alluded in his State of the Union speech to
the existence of an "Axis of Evil" that included Iraq, Iran, and North Korea.23 The
tension from the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 still gripped the nation and
President Bush appeared intent on setting the tone for a response beyond
24
Afghanistan. It is in this speech that President Bush first referred to preemption.
However, if we look at the language used in this speech, as well as other
references, we will in fact see that the President seems to be describing preventive
war, not preemption. 25
When the spread of chemical and biological and nuclear weapons, along with
ballistic missile technology-when that occurs, even weak states and small
groups could attain a catastrophic power to strike great nations ... But new
threats also require new thinking... In the world we have entered, the only path

20. The History Guide: Lectures on Modem European Intellectual History, Thomas Hobbes: 1588
- 1679, at http://www.historyguide.org/intellect/hobbes.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2005).
21. Karen Armstrong, Fresh Air with WHYY (National Public Radio broadcast, Mar. 8, 2004),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld= 751746.
22. President George W. Bush, Address at the Graduation Exercise of the United States Military
Academy (June 1, 2002), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html.
23. President George W. Bush, The State of the Union Address (Jan. 29, 2002),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11 .html.
24. President George W. Bush, supra note 22.
25. Id.
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to safety is the path of action. And this nation will act ...And our security will
require all Americans to be forward-looking and resolute, to be ready for
preemptive action when necessary to defend our liberty and to defend our
26

lives.

At the beginning of this quote, President Bush recognizes that the proposal is
novel, and is therefore a departure from previous doctrines or approaches in
foreign policy. Perhaps the Bush administration believed it was actually staying
within traditional domestic and international norms of preemption, yet decided to
present its tactics as innovative to gamer domestic support in a time of crisis and
uncertainty. However, looking further into what later became referred to as the
"Bush Doctrine," it appears that this proposed policy was in fact novel for the
United States, and was a departure from previous standards for a preemptive
military attack.
Additionally, the assertion that the "only path to safety is the path of action,"
seems to be based on the notion that there are only two options available: military
action or insecurity. Grotius cited the Roman historian Titus Livy on this subject:
"In the effort to guard against fear, men cause themselves to be feared, and we
inflict upon others the injury which has been warded off from ourselves, as if it
were necessary either to do or to suffer wrong. 27 It appears problematic to
suggest that, at any given time, there are no more than two alternatives. It is
peculiar to frame the circumstances to indicate that only one decision can lead to
security. More importantly, however, the notion that the unknown should move us
to military action is no longer premised on incontrovertible evidence of an
impending attack.28 This notion is based on the "belief that military conflict, while
not imminent, is inevitable, and that to delay would involve greater risk," or
preventive war as defined by the DOD.29
Next, Bush asserted:
We cannot defend America and our friends by hoping for the best. We cannot
put ourfaith in the word of tyrants, who solemnly sign non-proliferation treaties,
and then systemically break them. If we wait for threats to fully materialize, we
will have waited too long... Yet the war on terror will not be won on the
defensive. We must take the battle to3 the enemy, disrupt his plans, and confront
the worst threats before they emerge. 0

Looking closely at this excerpt, we see that the selected language does not
advocate a method of arriving at irrefutable evidence of danger to justify action.
Instead, the argument here rests on the severity of the threat and the imprudence of
hesitation. The line of reasoning is that the potential for mass casualties is so great
because of the threat of weapons of mass destruction that "hoping for the best" or

26. Id. (emphasis added).
27. GROTIUS, supra note 4,at Book II, Chapter V.
28. President George W.Bush, supra note 22.
29. UNITED STATES JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, supra note 3.
30. President George W. Bush, supra note 22 (emphasis added).
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putting "our faith in the word of tyrants" no longer makes sense. 31 This
terminology seems to point to the need for a foreign policy based on worst case
scenarios, since such scenarios cannot be ruled out. As discussed earlier, assuming
the worst and then acting upon this postulation does not fit into the definitions of
preemption that have been discussed in the first part of this paper.
Arguing against waiting "for threats to fully materialize" and confronting
them before they become apparent also seems to indicate an approach that is not
based on full knowledge, but one that proactively engages potential enemies before
attacks reach our homeland. Lastly, President Bush asserted that the struggle
against terrorism "will not be won on the defensive," raising serious doubts about
whether the actions encouraged here could still be defined as self-defense.32
To further investigate the exact type of policy advocated by the Bush
administration, we turn to the October 2002 National Security Strategy penned by
the White House.33 This was the first document of its kind released after the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. President Bush decided to outline his
overall strategy in combating terrorism in this document, which has given rise to
the term "Bush Doctrine." 34 It is here that we find the first formal document
detailing the framework of President Bush's vision of what he refers to as
preemption:
Legal scholars and international jurists often conditioned the legitimacy of
preemption on the existence of an imminent threat-most often a visible
mobilization of armies, navies, and air forces preparing to attack.
We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and
objectives of today's adversaries. Rogue states and terrorists do not seek to
attack us using conventional means. They know such attacks would fail.
Instead, they rely on acts of terror and, potentially, the use of weapons of mass
destruction-weapons that can be easily concealed, delivered covertly, and used
without warning.
The targets of these attacks are our military forces and our civilian
population, in direct violation of one of the principle norms of the law of
warfare. As was demonstrated by the losses on September 11, 2001, mass
civilian casualties is the specific objective of terrorists and these losses would be
exponentially more severe if terrorists acquired and used weapons of mass
destruction.
The United States has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to
counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the
greaterthe risk of inaction-andthe more compelling the case for taking

31. Id.
32. Id.
33. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, supra note 18
Doctrine
the
Bush
Evolution
of
The
Chronology:
34. Frontline,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/iraq/etc/cron.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2005).
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anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even ifuncertainty remains as to the
acts by
time and place of the enemy's attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile
35
our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively.

Notably, the threat being presented here is one of conjecture. Even a cursory
analysis will reveal that the attacks of September 11th did not entail terrorists
obtaining any type of weapons of mass destruction. This does not mean that the
threat described above does not exist or is irrelevant. However, in the context of
preemption, I believe that this danger must be categorized as hypothetical and,
therefore, a risk of severe destruction, not an imminent threat. To deal with this
menace militarily would thus be a preventive war, not preemption.
There is certainly recognition of the fact that the White House's proposal is a
departure from the traditional view of preemptive self-defense, which is evident in
the phrase, "we must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and
objectives of today's adversaries. ' 36 It seems that this is a common theme in the
argument for preemption by the Bush administration. The line of reasoning is that
the destructive power of today's weapons warrants an immediate response, lest we
suffer a terrible fate at the hands of weapons the world has not previously known.
However, it should be remembered that every preceding generation has not known
the destructive power of today's weaponry. Due to humanity's proclivity for
creating ever more devastating armaments, throughout the course of history each
generation has introduced death and destruction on a level that has never before
been seen. We are always at the apex of our potential for destruction. Therefore,
to assert that we are living in a new world describes the circumstances with which
every generation has had to struggle. This is not to minimize the prospective
devastation that might come from potential terrorists if they obtain weapons of
mass destruction and are able to elude our homeland defenses. The question
remains, however, to what point are we willing to extend our speculation once we
have dropped the standard of incontrovertible evidence of an imminent attack?
At this point, it is important to note that the means for evaluating threats to the
United States are under close scrutiny after the failure to find weapons of mass
destruction in Iraq, the discovery of an elaborate black-market nuclear weapons
proliferation program in Pakistan, the discovery that the nuclear weapons programs
of Iran and Libya were much more advanced than originally supposed, and the
inability to foresee or forestall the attacks of September 1 Ith. It seems that these
revelations raise serious doubts about our capacity for reliable and accurate
conjecture. The concepts of both preemption and preventive war presuppose a
capability to produce correct assessments of imminent and looming dangers. The
ethical ramifications of advocating actions based upon less than perfect
intelligence seem quite problematic.
The question that follows these disclosures is whether the Bush administration
continues to advocate the same type of anticipatory self-defense policy that it

35. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, supra note 18 (emphasis

added)
36. Id.
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presented in October 2002. The answer appears to be yes. In an interview with
Tim Russert of Meet the Press on February 8, 2004, President Bush discussed this
issue. 37 In light of the absence of weapons stockpiles that were alleged to exist in
Iraq, Russert asked about the concept of "preemption war," and whether a
preemptive war can be launched without ironclad evidence. 38 In this discussion,
President Bush responded:
The fundamental question is: Do you deal with the threat once you see it?
What-in the war on terror, how do you deal with threats? I dealt with a threat
by taking the case to the world and said, "Let's deal with this. We must deal with
it now."

I repeat to you what I strongly believe, that inaction in Iraq would have
emboldened Saddam Hussein. He could have developed a nuclear weapon over
time-I'm not saying immediately, but over time-which would have then put
us in what position? We would have been in a position of blackmail.
In other words, you can't rely upon a madman, and he was a madman. You
can't rely upon him making rational decisions when it comes to war and peace,
and it's too late, in my39judgment, when a madman who has got terrorist
connections is able to act.
By the definitions articulated in the beginning of this paper, 40 it appears that
the President was speaking of preventive war, since the justification for acting,
before the dangerous weapons were produced and for waging war on another
country, is the risk of not acting. President Bush asserted that the danger comes
from hesitation, not from existing circumstances and capabilities.4'
In a February 23, 2004 article, "The Right War for the Right Reasons,"
printed in The Weekly Standard,Robert Kagan and William Kristol, self described
members of the Project for the New American Century,
neo-conservatives and
42
argue the same point:
Did the administration claim the Iraqi threat was imminent, in the sense that Iraq
possessed weapons that were about to be used against the United States? That is
the big charge leveled by the Bush administration's critics these days. It is rather
surprising, given the certainty with which this charge is thrown around, how
little the critics have in the way of quotations from administration officials to
back it up. Saying that action is urgent is not the same thing as saying the threat
is imminent. In fact, the president said the threat was not imminent, and that we

37. Meet the Press(NBC television broadcast, Feb. 8, 2004).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. UNITED STATES JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, supra note 2; UNITED STATES JOINT CHIEFS OF

STAFF, supra note 3.

41. President George W. Bush, supra note 22.
42. Robert Kagan and William Kristol, The Right War for the Right Reasons, 9 THE WKLY
2004),
23,
23
(Feb.
STANDARD
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/003/735tahyk.asp.
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43
had to act (urgently) before the threat became imminent.

What we see here is an even more explicit argument against the standard of
preemption with the rejection of an imminent attack as the proper standard. It
seems too restrictive to wait for a threat to become immediate, and hence,
preventive war would be necessary and just. In fact, the argument here seems to
imply that anything less would be imprudent and irresponsible.
Implications and Conclusions
If we have in fact established that, due to its vague and speculative criteria,
preventive war is a more tenuous prospect than that of preemptive action, then
there would certainly be legal and ethical implications. As mentioned earlier, this
author believes that moral behavior and international law are often based on the
notion that the norms we choose are largely crafted by the actions we would not
like to see visited upon us. Consequently, the question must be raised as to
whether preventive war is the type of normative behavior one would like to see
operating freely in the international sphere, or, more specifically, waged against
one's own nation. It certainly seems to be the case that law loses its meaning if all
are not bound by it. That which is deemed legal for one nation should be applied
to all. Given the unrivaled and unprecedented military power of the United States,
the criteria of possessing the capability for mounting an attack will always be met,
leaving open only the question of intent. Since the interpretation of U.S. intentions
by a potential adversary is a purely subjective exercise, one might be wary of such
a low standard for waging war.
It should be noted that this type of subjective and speculative standard for war
seems to contradict every intention of the U.N. Charter. One reason for this
omission might be that it would be nearly impossible to write a statute that
legalizes certain types of unverifiable military action while outlawing others.
Hence, all preventive war in which the "belief that military conflict, while not
imminent, is inevitable, and that to delay would involve greater risk," would need
to be deemed legal. 44 As we have seen, it is quite possible, and perhaps sometimes
reasonable, to make the case in certain circumstances that a particular nation
represents a real threat to another nation's security. However, ethical and legal
codes are more appropriately constructed under a "veil of ignorance" in which we
are oblivious to our own capabilities and circumstances so that we can achieve true
equity. 45 If such determinations of law and ethics are made while primarily
considering our own self-interest, they no longer can be deemed ethical, nor can
they achieve the equity that just law promises.
In addition, it should be noted that although it is usually the activity of
international jurists and political scientists to discuss the justness of a particular
war, I believe that these determinations have real repercussions and are in fact
more importantly decided on the ground in today's world. Even if there were a

43. Id.
44. UNITED STATES JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, supra note 3.

45. This model and phrase comes from JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971), in which he
describes the "original position" that allows us to understand his theory of"justice as fairness."
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broad consensus of the legality of a particular military action, and a U.N. Security
Council resolution were passed to codify this conclusion, it would ultimately still
be up to the people of the invaded nation to decide upon the legitimacy of that
invasion. It also seems that the development of non-violent action and guerilla
warfare throughout the twentieth century have given rise to tactics that people have
learned and implemented to resist perceived injustice even in the face of the most
powerful militaries of the world. For this reason, it is imperative that we
understand that the standards discussed here are for our own benefit and not simply
constraints on one's action. The norm suggested here is also a guideline for how
others will interpret military actions that are not based on incontrovertible evidence
of imminent attack, even if they are justified at home.
The intent of this paper is to clarify the distinction of the terms preemption
and preventive war, and hopefully, the examination of legal and historical citations
has brought some clarity to the current discourse. I also hoped to highlight the
important difference between the two terms and to further elucidate each of their
implications in international law and moral theory. As stated earlier, both ethics
and international law are based on an inter-subjectivity that this author alone
cannot accomplish. Therefore, it falls upon the reader to determine whether the
legal distinctions drawn and the claims of morality presented have been persuasive.
If in fact this lofty goal is accomplished, then it is hoped and encouraged that these
terms will be used in their proper context in the future so that the ambiguity that
has clouded the national debate can be lifted and an open and honest discourse may
ensue. This would perhaps pave the way for reasonable people to agree or
disagree on the philosophical tenets of these terms and not to be distracted or
confused by their ambiguity.
To conclude, I return to Grotius, whose nearly four-hundred-year-old words
continue to embody meaning and salience:
Further, if a man is not planning an immediate attack, but it has been ascertained
that he has formed a plot, or is preparing an ambuscade, or that he is putting
poison in our way, or that he is making ready a false accusation and a false
evidence, and is corrupting the judicial procedure, I maintain that he cannot
lawfully be killed, either if the danger can in any other way be avoided, or if it is
not altogether certain that the danger cannot otherwise be avoided. Generally, in
fact, the delay that will intervene affords opportunity to apply many remedies, to
take advantage of many accidental occurrences; as the proverb runs, 'There's
many a slip 'twixt cup and lip.' There are, it is true, theologians and jurists who
would extend their indulgence somewhat further; but the46opinion stated, which is
better and safer, does not lack the support of authorities.

46. GROTIUS, supra note 4, at 184.

